PENNSYLVANIA'S "SUNSHINE LAW":
PROBLEMS OF CONSTRUCTION AND ENFORCEMENT
To make plans on public affairs outside the Senate or
the public elections is an offense punishable by death.
The reason for this, [the Utopians] say, is to make it
difficult for the President and the tranibores to conspire
together to oppress the people with a dictatorship and
so change the constitution.'
Saint Thomas, lawyer that he was, doubtless realized that no
common law equivalent of the Utopian "Open Meeting Act" existed in England in the age of the Star Chamber and High
Commission; nor does one exist today.2 Neither does any such3
right vest in the general public under our federal Constitution,
although many of the state constitutions require at least that
certain sessions of the legislature be held in public. 4 To supplement their constitutional provisions, most of the legislatures have
passed some form of open meeting act, requiring that the meetings of at least some state agencies and local governing bodies be
open to the public. 5 In addition to guaranteeing the public access
to governmental meetings, many legislatures have also enacted
right to know laws designed to protect public access to governmental documents. 6 Still other statutes grant access to the meetings and/or the records of specific public
bodies, either to in7
terested citizens or the public at large.
1T. MORE, UTOPIA 50 (P. Marshall transl. 1965).
Park, Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act, 1960, 25 MOD. L. REV. 204 (1962).
Public access to certain local meetings is now protected in England by statute, id.; Garner,
The Public Bodies (Admission to Meetings) Act, 1960, 105 SOL. J. 191 (1961).
3 See Note, Open Meeting Statutes: The Press Fightsfor the "Right to Know," 75 HARV. L.
REV. 1199, 1203 (1962). Such a right of the general public to attend legislative sessions,
etc., is, of course, to be distinguished from a criminal defendant's right to a public trial,
U.S. CONST. amend. VI, and the right of an interested party to attend and be heard at
judicial or quasi-judicial hearings determinative of his rights, see, e.g., Chester County
Bank v. East Whiteland Twp., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 384 (Chester County Ct. Quarter Sess.
1962).
4 Note, supra note 3, at 1203. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. 2, § 13 (1968).
1 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, §§ 393-94 (1958), the earliest such statute in any of the
American states; CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 54950-60 (West 1966) (applicable only to local
governing bodies); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A, § 1 A, ch. 34, § 9F, ch. 39, §§ 23A-C
(1973).
' See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-.4 (1959), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65,
§ 66.1 (Supp. 1975). See also 5 U.S.C. § 552. This Comment will refer to a statute
guaranteeing public access to governmental records as a "right-to-know law," applying
"Freedom of Information Act" as a general term descriptive of open meeting acts as well
as right
to know laws.
7
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22-32-108(5) (1974). See generally 31 PA. L.
ENCYCLOPEDIA Records § 5 (1960).
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Pennsylvania common law prior to 1957 authorized "any
person who had a personal or property interest ... to examine
and inspect public records . . .";8 such interested parties, however, may have been the only ones entitled to such access. 9 In
part to clarify the confusions of the common law, 10 the legislature in 1957 passed a Right to Know Law opening financial and
certain other records of a limited class of government agencies to
all citizens of the Commonwealth." In the same term the legislature also passed an Open Meeting Act requiring that the meetings of certain state and local governmental bodies be open to
the public and that notice of such meetings be given to the press
and public.' 2 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, has
given restrictive readings to the Right to Know Law on at least
two occasions,' 3 and the Open Meeting Act excepted a broad
14
class of meetings from its coverage.
In 1973, the lower house of the legislature adopted the
"Sunshine Rule" opening hitherto secret meetings of House
committees,' 5 and Representative James Knepper introduced
legislation 16 designed to open meetings of various state and local
agencies. As finally enacted, this Sunshine Law' 7 requires all
state and local "agencies,"' 8 the boards of trustees of all community colleges and state-aided or -affiliated colleges and
8 Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 348, 141 A.2d 844, 848 (1958); cf. Mooney v. Trustees of Temple Univ., 448 Pa. 424, 429-30 n.10, 292 A.2d 395, 398 n.10 (1972).
9 Mooney v. Trustees of Temple Univ., 448 Pa. 424, 429-30 n.10, 292 A.2d 395, 398
n.10 (1972).
10 Wiley v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 349-50, 141 A.2d 844, 848-49 (1958).
11 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 66.1-.4 (1959), as amended, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.1

(Supp. 1975).
12 Pub. L. No. 213, [1957] Pa. Laws 392.
,3 See Mooney v. Trustees of Temple Univ., 448 Pa. 424, 292 A.2d 395 (1972); Wiley
v. Woods, 393 Pa. 341, 141 A.2d 844 (1958).
14 Pub. L. No. 213, § I(B) [1957] Pa. Laws 392, provided in part: "[T]he term 'Public
Meeting' shall not mean any meeting, the publication of the facts concerning which
would disclose the institution, progress or result of an investigation undertaken by a
board in the performance of its official duties." Although the Open Meeting Act provided no sanctions beyond a $25 fine for each violation, id. § 254, the lower courts
fashioned an invalidation remedy to enforce the Act. See, e.g., Bradley v. Radnor Twp.,
51 D. & C.2d 160 (C.P. Delaware County 1971). Quasi-judicial actions taken at hearings
of which interested parties had no notice and at which they had no opportunity to be
heard have also been invalidated on due process grounds. Chester County Bank v. East
Whiteland Twp., 27 D. & C.2d 384, 394-95 (Chester County Ct. Quarter Sess. 1962).
,5 "All public hearings shall be open to the public and reasonable opportunity to be
heard shall be afforded to all interested parties .... " Pa. H.R. Rule 50, Pa. H.R. Res. 4,
1973 Sess.
16 Pa. H.R. Bill 124, 1973 Sess.
17 Open Meeting Law, Act No. 175 (July 19, 1974) (codified at PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65,
§§ 261-69 (Supp. 1975)) [hereinafter cited as Pennsylvania Sunshine Law].
18 Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Supp. 1975).
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universities, l9 the General Assembly and its committees, 2° the
governor's cabinet, 2' and any "similar organization created by or
pursuant to a statute which declares in substance that the organization performs or has for its purpose the performance of an
essential governmental function" 22 to hold public meetings
whenever any "formal action '23 is taken. The statute also requires public notice prior to any such meeting, 24 limits executive
sessions to the hearing of complaints against and the disciplining or discharge of an employee or the planning of labor negotiations,25 and provides for the invalidation of any action
taken in violation of the Act, 26 the enjoining of future
violations,27 and the punishment of any public official attending
a secret meeting in violation of the Act. 28 The Act is broadly
drawn, however, and sufficient ambiguities exist to require sub29
stantial judicial interpretation.
This Comment will examine the extent of the Sunshine
Law's coverage: the type of action covered, the types of bodies
covered, and the exceptions from coverage. The Comment will
also consider the enforcement provisions of the Act, particularly
the criminal and invalidation provisions.
I.

THE COVERAGE OF THE ACT

A.

Types of Action Covered

The Sunshine Law requires that "[t]he meetings or hearings
of every agency at which formal action is scheduled or taken are
public meetings and shall be open to the public at all times. No
formal action shall be valid unless such formal action is taken
during a public meeting. ' 30 "Formal action" is defined as "the
taking of any vote on any resolution, rule, order, motion, regulation or ordinance or the setting of any official policy."'31 This
19Id.
20
21

22

Id. §§ 1, 7, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 261, 267 (Supp. 1975).

Id. §

1, PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 65, § 261 (Supp. 1975).

1d.
231d.

Id. § 5, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 265 (Supp. 1975).
Id. § 4, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 264 (Supp. 1975).
26 Id. §§ 2, 9, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 262, 269 (Supp. 1975).
27 Id. § 9, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (Supp. 1975).
28 Id. § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 268 (Supp. 1975).
29 One of the co-sponsors of the legislation has predicted court tests for as long as
five years. Thomson, 'Sunshine' Law to Open Some of Phila.'s Secret Meetings, The Evening
Bulletin (Philadelphia), Aug. 28, 1974, at 20, col. 2.
30 Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Supp. 1975).
31Id. § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. § 261 (Supp. 1975).
24
2-
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coverage is substantially broader than that accorded by New
Jersey's open meeting act, which requires public meetings only
when a determination is made by vote, 32 but is potentially narrower than the coverage of those statutes containing blanket
33
prohibitions of secret or executive sessions.
The explication of the statutory terms "setting of any official
policy" and "meeting or hearing" was left to the Attorney General and the courts. The Attorney General has defined the setting of a policy as "any discussions, deliberations or decisions
with regard to the formation, endorsement, ratification or approval of a program or general plan pursuant to which agency
business will be conducted or agency decisions made . . .34
He has defined a meeting as "any gathering of those members
of an agency with sufficient voting power to make a determination on behalf of the entire agency-i.e., a majority or quorum
of the agency . . . -35 Although this narrow interpretation of
"meeting or hearing" may seem to conflict with the broad
statutory purpose,3 6 the distinction between the criminal and
invalidation provisions of the Sunshine Law resolves the apparent contradiction.
Although isolated instances of less-than-quorum meetings
fall outside the scope of the Act, the Attorney General has emphasized that "if a series of meetings of less than a quorum of an
agency are used as a subterfuge to avoid the public meeting
requirements of the act, there would be a violation. '3 7 That a
secret discussion was not a "meeting," therefore, does not prevent subsequent formal action tainted by that secrecy from being
invalidated.
The narrow definition of "meeting" does, however, limit the
scope of the Act's criminal provision by preventing the punishment of public officials' innocent discussion of public affairs.
The Sunshine Law's criminal provision states that "[a]ny mem32 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:4-2, 4-3 (Supp. 1975). See generally Wolf v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 79 N.J. Super. 546, 552, 192 A.2d 305, 308 (App. Div. 1963).
'3 See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 393 (1958). In the absence of language defining the
action subject to the statute, however, at least one court has, on its own initiative, defined
such action narrowly. Adler v. City Council, 184 Cal. App. 2d 763, 7 Cal. Rptr. 805 (Ct.
App. 1960). The California legislature subsequently amended the state's open meeting
act (the Ralph M. Brown Act) by adding a definition of "action taken" substantially more
expansive than that applied by the Adler court. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 54952.6 (West 1966);
see 42 OP. CAL- ATTy GEN. 61 (1963).
34 Op. PA. ATT'y GEN. No. 46, in The Legal Intelligencer (Philadelphia), Sept. 24,
1974, at 13, col. 5.

33 Id.
36 As the Attorney General himself has recognized, "the Legislature intended 'any'

vote 3to be open, not just 'formal' votes taken at formal meetings ....
7 Id. 14, col. 2.

Id.

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 124:536

ber of any agency who participates in a meeting or hearing
knowing that it is being held or conducted in such a way to intentionally prevent an interested party from attending or with
the intent and purpose of violating this act is guilty of a summary offense . . . .38 By adopting the Attorney General's narrow
definition of "meeting," then, the courts can avoid punishment of innocent discussion of public affairs by public officials while invalidating formal action tainted by such private
discussions unless subsequently "ratified" 39 at a public meeting
through sufficient discussion and debate to apprise the
public
40
of the significance of and reasons for the action taken.
B. The Agencies Covered
The Sunshine Law is applicable to the meetings or hearings
of "agencies." '4 ' Section one of the Act defines "agency" as
any branch, department, board, authority or commission of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, any political subdivision of the Commonwealth, or any State,
municipal, township or school authority, school board,
school governing body, commission, the board of trustees of all State-aided colleges and universities and all
community colleges, or similar organization created by
or pursuant to a statute which declares in substance that
the organization performs or has for its purpose the
performance of an essential governmental function:
Provided, That the term "agency" shall include the
General Assembly, or any State department, board, authority or commission to include the governor's cabinet,
42
when meeting on official policy making business.
This definition is most inartfully drawn and can be parsed in two
ways. One possible reading would be to consider everything
from the first "of" to the beginning of the proviso as a prepositional phrase modifying "branch, department, board, authority
or commission." Under this reading, "any branch, department,
3s Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 268 (Supp. 1975) (em-

phasis supplied).
39See text accompanying notes 134-37 infra.
40
See generally Op.PA. ATT'y GEN. No. 46, supra note 34, at 14, col. 5.
41 Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Supp. 1975). The
Act also covers "all meetings of committees [of the General Assembly] where bills are
considered, all [Legislative] hearings where testimony is taken, [and] all sessions of the
House of Representatives and Senate ... Id. § 7, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 267 (Supp.
1975).
42
1d. § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261 (Supp. 1975).
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authority or commission of... any State, municipal, township or
school authority" would be covered by the Act.

Although this reading derives some support from the
Statutory Construction Act, 43 the legislature, had it intended to
include the subcommittees of parent bodies within the definition

of agency, could have done so far more directly. A more likely
reading of the statute is that five types of organizations are included within the meaning of "agency": (1) "any branch, department, board, authority or commission of the Commonwealth

of Pennsylvania";

(2) "any

political

subdivision

of the

Commonwealth"; 4 4 (3) "any State, municipal, township or school
authority, school board, school governing body [or]
commission"; 45 (4) "the board of trustees of all State-aided colleges and universities, the board of trustees of all State-owned
and State-related colleges and universities and all community
colleges"; (5) "any similar organization created by or pursuant to
a statute which declares in substance that the organization performs or has for its purpose the performance of an essential
governmental function." Under this reading, meetings of a subcommittee of a parent body, at which a quorum of the parent
46
body is not present, are not subject to the Act.
C. Limitations on the Act's Coverage
The broad coverage of the Act which results from the definition of "agency" contravenes public policies in several sit43Such a reading would accord with two presumptions of the Statutory Construction
Act---"That the General Assembly intends to favor the public interest as against any
private interest," PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1922(5) (Supp. 1974), and that "All ... provi-

sions of a statute [other than eight specific exceptions, not here relevant] shall be liberally
construed to effect their objects and to promote justice," id. § 1928(c).
44This phrase may be superfluous if "any State, municipal, township or school
authority, school governing body [or] commission" is read to include the boards of
commissioners and city councils of municipalities, townships, boroughs, and counties.
45As officially punctuated, this portion of the Act is unintelligible. In order to
remedy this defect, the word "commission" is here grouped with the phrase "any State,
municipal, township or school authority, school board, school governing body" and the
comma between "school governing body" and "commission" replaced with the conjunction "or." Such repunctuation is permissible under the Statutory Construction Act.
"Grammatical errors shall not vitiate a statute. A transposition of words and clauses may
be resorted to where a statute is without meaning as it stands." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, §
1923(a) (1974). "Words and phrases which may be necessary to the proper interpretation
of a statute and which do not conflict with its obvious purpose and intent, nor in any way
affect its scope and operation, may be added in the construction thereof." Id. § 1923(c).
This repunctuation causes the definition to include the boards of commissioners and city
councils of municipalities, townships, boroughs, and counties.
46A much simpler definition has been proposed in a model open meeting statute
drafted by Common Cause:
"Public body" means any administrative, advisory, executive, or legislative body
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uations. To prevent the subversion of these policies, the Act
provides four exceptions to the general rule that an agency is
subject to the open meeting requirements.
1. The Exception for Disciplinary Proceedings
and Labor Negotiations
Section three of the Sunshine Law provides:
No public meeting of any agency shall be adjourned, begun, recessed or interrupted in any way for
the purpose of an executive session except as hereinafter provided. An executive session may be held during the course of a properly conducted public meeting
upon notification to the public present by the presiding
officer that for a period not to exceed thirty minutes
the meeting will be in recess for the purpose of:
(1) Considering the dismissal or discipling of, or
hearing complaints or charges brought against a public
elected officer, employee, or other public agent unless
such person requests a public hearing.
(2) Considering actions of the deliberating body
47
with respect to labor negotiations.
Although this section authorizes only the interruption of public
meetings for thirty minutes, it is reas6nable to read the section as
authorizing executive sessions scheduled separately from the
public sessions and lasting as long as necessary if the only business there discussed is that authorized by the section. 48 Once the
preliminary investigations and discussions are completed, however, must final actions be taken in public session? The Attorney
General of Pennsylvania has justifiably answered this question in
49
the affirmative.
of the state or local political subdivision of the state, or any other entity created
by law, that expends or disburses or is supported in whole or in part by tax
revenue, including but not limited to any branch, commission, committee, subcommittee, or other subsidiary thereof.
Common Cause, An Act Requiring Open Meetings of Public Bodies § 2(b), June 1, 1974
(on file with the University of PennsylvaniaLaw Review). While this definition specifically
includes the subcommittees of parent bodies, its failure specifically to include the
governor's cabinet and privately owned but state-supported colleges and universities
could result in narrow judicial interpretations exempting these bodies from coverage. On
the other hand, it could be argued that not only private colleges and universities but also
many other private eleemosynary institutions such as hospitals and orphanages are creatures of the corporate law and so subject to the model act once they accept state funds.
4 Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 3, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 263 (Supp. 1975).
48
See Op. PA. Arr'y GEN. No. 46, supra note 34, at 14, col. 2.
4 Id. 14, col. 3.
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In the first place, the language of section three goes no
further than to authorize executive sessions to consider complaints and labor negotiations; "consideration" suggests those
preliminary discussions preparatory to a formal vote yet still sufficiently determinative of "official policy" as to constitute "formal
action" under the Act. 50 Furthermore, the legislative history indicates a concern primarily that these preliminary stages be conducted secretly whenever the agency deems it advisable. In the
context of disciplinary proceedings, Representative Kester,
proponent and supporter of several restrictive amendments,
sought no more than the right to conduct such informal discussions in executive sessions as were necessary to protect the privacy and reputation of public officials. 5 1 Once such private discussions have been completed, it should work no injustice on any
public official for the agency to proceed publicly either to state
that the charges were groundless or to discipline the public official by formal action accompanied by a statement of the grounds
therefor. In the context of labor negotiations, the legislative history exhibits a concern only for the injurious effects of premature publicity. 52 In both the disciplinary proceeding and labor
negotiation areas, therefore, only preliminary investigations and
discussions should be exempt from the Act. As so construed,
section three would protect public officials from unsubstantiated
charges 53 without allowing the concealment of official wrongdoing, and would free labor negotiations from the public pos54
turing that could render any settlement impossible.
A significant problem with this section of the Act is its failure to provide for other situations in which "premature publicity
would be detrimental to the interest of the community, as by
revealing information to individuals who might profit at public
expense."5 5 Such instances will be most frequently encountered
in cases of land acquisition. 56 Although agencies may succeed in

-ISee generally text accompanying

note 34 supra.
51PA. H.R. JOUR. 2155 (Oct. 3, 1973); cf. id. 3094 (Jan. 21, 1974) (colloquy between
Representatives Gleason and Knepper).
52 PA. H.R JOUR. 1840 (July 24, 1973) (remarks of Representative Maloney).
'3The secrecy, of course, would not be absolute: witnesses and complainants would
still be free to discuss their testimony in public. In view of this fact, therefore, the agency
might well choose not to exercise its § 3 privilege, or the official might well demand a
public hearing, so as to prevent the spread of rumors and protect himself from smear by
leak; such a choice, however, has rightly been left to the agency and official concerned.
Cf. Comment, Access to Governmental Information in California, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1650,
1657-58 (1966).
'4See PA. H.R. JOUR. 2150 (Oct. 3, 1973) (remarks of Representative Rappaport).
'5Note, supra note 3, at 1209.
56
See id.
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persuading the courts that preliminary stages of real estate
negotiations are not "formal action," prompt legislative
amendment57 is desirable to prevent the possible invalidation of
necessary real estate acquisitions; that section three provides
specific exemptions from the Act may lead the courts to conclude that such real estate negotiations, since not specifically exempted, are covered by the Act.
2. The Exception for Emergencies
Section 5(e) of the Sunshine Law provides that the public
meeting and notice requirements of the Act shall not apply to an
agency meeting held "to deal with an actual emergency involving
a clear and present danger to life and property."5 8 This section
should not be read so narrowly as the "clear and present danger"
test formulated by Mr. Justice Holmes5 9 in the context of first
amendment litigation; rather, the courts should adopt what
could be called a "critical point" test: if the agency does not act
immediately, without recourse to the Act's formalities, does a
reasonable possibility exist that life or property may be endangered? As the sponsor of the amendment including section
5(e) noted,
[T]he actual emergency exists when the weather forecast is bad, when waters are rising in an adjoining state,
under any of these conditions.
I do not think you have to have the floodwaters at
your doorstep to get an actual emergency. An emergency exists when the threat arises. 60
Because it is the primary responsibility of the agency
charged with safeguarding the public to decide when an actual
emergency exists, the courts should adopt the position that a
reasonable belief by the agency that an actual emergency exists is
sufficient to protect agency actions against invalidation. 6 ' An attempt by the courts to second-guess the agency's reasonable
51A requirement that the minutes of any such preliminary negotiations be published
after final action has been taken would prevent any abuse of the exemption.
58Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 5(e), PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 265(e) (Supp. 1975).
59See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
60 PA. H.R. JouR. 3184 (Jan. 28, 1974) (response of Representative Englehart
to
interrogation by Representative Kester).
61Of course, § 8's scienter requirements would protect the agency members against
criminal prosecution. Invocation of the reasonable belief defense to an invalidation action, however, might not be consistent with the scope of the invalidation remedy, see text
accompanying notes 116-21 infra.
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judgments could cause private parties to become reluctant to
contract with agencies in such emergency situations lest the contracts be invalidated. Because the purpose of section 5(e) was to
authorize agency action in situations where the press of time
does not permit compliance with the Act's notice requirements,6 2
agency members would not appear to be justified in deliberately
excluding members of the public unless such exclusion is necessary for the expeditious handling of the emergency.
3.

The Party Caucus Exception

Section seven of the Sunshine Law provides:
For the purpose of this act, meetings of the Legislature which are covered are as follows: all meetings of
committees where bills are considered, all hearings
where testimony is taken, all sessions of the House of
Representatives and the Senate. Not included in the in63
tent of this act are party caucuses.
This section is an amplification of the definition of "agency,"
which broadly includes the General Assembly. 64 The last sentence of the section is apparently a proviso meant to ensure that
the privacy of legislative caucuses will be respected. Read in the
context of the entire section, the party caucus section should
have no application to party caucuses of local governing
bodies. 65 This limited reading of the party caucus exception is
justified as a matter of policy; if a local governing body is
controlled by a lopsided majority with the immense patronage
powers of a local political organization, as in the case of the
Philadelphia City Council, 66 or if, as in the case of the county
commissions of the suburban counties, 6 7 a local governing body
is composed of one minority and two majority commissioners,
the latter of whom dominate the commission, any party caucus
exception would simply gut the Act.
Although the courts could vindicate the overriding policy of
62

See generally PA. H.R. JOUR. 3184 (Jan. 28, 1974).
63 Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 7, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 267 (Supp. 1975).
64Id. § 1, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 261.

65
But see Statement of George X. Schwartz, President, Philadelphia City Council
(quoted in The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Oct. 11, 1974, at 9, col. 1): "As long as
the Legislature takes the position that its party caucuses are closed, I see no reason why
Council should take a different position."
66 Thomson, supra note 29, at 20, cols. 7-8.
67 See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 501 (1956). The organization of county governments
could change with the ratification of "home rule" charters pursuant to the Home Rule
Charter and Optional Plans Law, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 53, § 1-101 to -1309 (1974).
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the Act by reading the party caucus exception in the context of
the whole of section seven, the legislative history could preclude
such a reading 8 The legislature, therefore, should amend the
Act specifically to cover party caucuses of local governing bodies,
at least when two-thirds of6such
an agency is controlled by mem'
bers of one political party.
4.

The Confidentiality Exception

Section ten of the Sunshine Law repeals all previous legislation inconsistent with the Act except for "those statutes which
70
specifically provide for the confidentiality of information.
This exception will serve two important purposes: it will preserve to the agencies the attorney-client privilege, and it will
protect private citizens, especially welfare recipients, from invasions of privacy.
Although there is no Pennsylvania statute granting a blanket
right of attorney-client confidentiality, an attorney is incompetent to testify to confidential communications, and his client cannot "be compelled to disclose the same, unless in either case this
privilege be waived upon the trial by the client."'7 1 Although
section ten would appear to protect this privilege, the Attorney
General of Pennsylvania has held
that the Sunshine Law consti72
tutes a waiver of this privilege.
In reaching this conclusion, the Attorney General relied
heavily upon Florida's Sunshine Law, noting that "[t]hough not
identical, Florida's Sunshine Law is sufficiently like Pennsylvania's to provide a valuable precedent. '7 3 Nothing could be
further from the truth. First, unlike the Pennsylvania law, the
Florida act contains no exception for confidentiality. Moreover,
the Florida act was sharply criticized by Pennsylvania legislators
supporting the Sunshine Law. 74 Results under the Florida act
68 Representative Knepper, responding to interrogation by Representative Rappaport, indicated that it was not his intention that the legislation apply to party caucuses
of local governing bodies. PA. H.R. JOUR. 1839 (July 24, 1973).
69 A two-thirds rule would cover those local bodies lopsidedly dominated by one
political party whose caucus controls the policies set by the agency, see text accompanying
note 67 supra, as well as the suburban county commissions.
70 Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 10, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, note following § 261
(Supp. 1975).
71 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 321 (1958).
72 Op. PA. ATT'Y GEN. No. 46, supra note 34, at 14, col. 4.

73Id.
74 Representative Wise, a co-sponsor and, with Representative Knepper, a leading
supporter of the Pennsylvania act, spoke disparagingly of the Florida statute: "There is
one thing that this bill is not, . . . it is not the Florida 'sunshine' law .... Two fellows
could not drive to work together [in Florida] and discuss the business of the day without
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are thus not useful precedent in Pennsylvania; the Attorney
General's conclusion, insofar as it relies upon Florida precedent,
should not be followed.
Section ten can also be interpreted so as to protect the privacy of welfare recipients. The Public Welfare Code places the
burden on those seeking information about welfare recipients to
come forward with the names of those recipients concerning
whom inquiry is being made.7 5 Because the Pennsylvania supreme court has interpreted this statute to limit the 1957 Right
to Know Law, 76 a similar construction of the Sunshine Law could
prevent public and, most importantly, press attendance at most
welfare hearings under the section ten exception.
II.

THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT

The Sunshine Law contains three enforcement mechanisms:
the injunctive power, the invalidation provision, and the criminal
penalty. No reported criminal prosecutions under any such open
meeting acts in other states exist, 77 so that the criminal penalties
are probably the least important enforcement mechanism in the
Act. At least potentially, the invalidation provision could prove
the most potent; citizens seeking admission to a meeting can
threaten prolonged litigation questioning the validity of any actions taken at the secret meeting, thus effectively frustrating, for
example, contracts entered into by the agency. The criminal and
invalidation provisions pose serious questions involving both interpretation and execution of the Act. The injunctive power, on
the other hand, should not tend to frustrate any governmental
actions because it can be applied purely prospectively and under
the strict supervision of the courts. This Comment, therefore,
will consider only the criminal and invalidation provisions.

being subject to arrest. That is not what we are doing." PA. H.R. JOUR. 1924 (July 25,
1973).
75PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 425 (1968). See also 42 U.S.C. § 302(a)(7) (Supp. II, 1972).
76 McMullan v. Wohlgemuth, 453 Pa. 147, 156, 308 A.2d 888, 902 (1973).
77 Such prosecutions may well be occurring with some frequency before the minor
judiciary, however. See, e.g., Letter from President Judge Joseph R. Glancey, Philadelphia
Municipal Court, to Francis J. Sullivan, July 14, 1975; The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), June 21, 1975, at 3, col. 1. Judge Glancey's holding that the criminal section of the
Act is unconstitutionally vague, Letter, supra, finds strong support in legislative confusion
over the meaning of "formal action." Compare PA. H.R. JOUR. 1840 (July 24, 1973)
(remarks of Representative Knepper) with id. (remarks of Representative Wise). The case
was appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on petition for a writ of mandamus to
compel Judge Glancey to issue the summonses requested, Shapiro v. Glancey, No. 476,
Misc. Docket 20 (Pa. Sup. Ct., filed Aug. 8, 1975); but the petition was denied, by order
without opinion, with Justice Roberts dissenting, id. (Pa. Sup. Ct., Nov. 26, 1975).
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A. The Criminal Penalty
A number of state open meeting acts provide criminal
penalties as an enforcement device. Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas,
Louisiana, New Mexico, South Dakota, and Utah, among others,
provide that any violation of the act be punished as a misdemeanor. 78 Such acts generally do not require that the of79
fender be a member of the agency holding the secret meeting,
and the Louisiana statute specifically makes criminal any conspiracy to hinder or attempt to hinder "attendance by the public at meetings, declared by this chapter to be public meetings.""" The California and Florida acts, on the other hand,
are examples of those making criminal only attendance at a meeting conducted in violation of the act.8 1 Although most of the acts
do not specify the degree of scienter required to constitute a
82
violation, those that do require either knowledge or wilfulness.
There has been no significant judicial discussion 83 and no judicial creation of any scienter requirements, but a knowing-or at
least reckless-violation should be the appropriate minimal jus84
tification for invocation of criminal penalties.
Pennsylvania's Sunshine Law, like the California act, makes
criminal only knowing attendance at an illegal meeting, 8 5 and
86
provides a maximum fine of one hundred dollars plus costs.
Unlike the California and Florida acts, however, the Pennsylvania law requires not simply that the defendant agency member
know that the meeting is being held in violation of the Act, but
that he know that the meeting is being held with the intention of
violating the Act. 87 Although Pennsylvania's provision is thus
78

ALA.

CODE tit.

14, § 394 (1958); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 38-431.06 (Supp. 1973);

ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2807 (1968) (wilful and knowing violation); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
42, § 9(B) (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 5-6-26 (Supp. 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 52-4-4 (1970); UTAH CODE ANN. § 52-4-4 (1970).
71 But see S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 1-25-5 (1974).
80 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 42,
81 CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54959

§ 9(B) (Supp. 1975).
(West 1966); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 286.011(3) (1975).
Alabama provides that violation of the act as well as attendance at such an illegal meeting
shall constitute a misdemeanor. ALA. CODE tit. 14, § 394 (1958).
82 See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2807 (1968); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54959 (West 1966).
" 3 See generally Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd. of Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485-86 (Ct. App. 1968).
84 Note, supra note 3, at 1211. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(3) (Proposed
Official Draft 1962); Sacramento Newspaper Guild v. Sacramento County Bd.of Supervisors, 263 Cal. App. 2d 41, 48, 69 Cal. Rptr. 480, 485-86 (Ct. App. 1968); Comment,
supra note 53, at 1662.
8I Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
65, § 268 (Supp. 1975).
Id.
87 See text accompanying notes 88-96 infra. Compare Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 8,
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 268 (Supp. 1975), with CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54959 (West 1966) and
86

FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 286.011(3) (1975).
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more narrowly drawn than California's or Florida's, three difficulties remain: a member who in the best of faith protests the
illegality of a meeting but remains in attendance is subject to
criminal prosecution; 88 the presence of criminal provisions may
result in stricter construction of the Act;8 9 and members may
find themselves subject to harrassing and discriminatorily selective prosecutions." Before these problems are treated, however,
a peculiarity in the language of section eight, which could
broaden the coverage of the Act, deserves consideration.
1. Intentional Exclusion of an Interested Party
Section eight of the Pennsylvania Sunshine Law makes criminal not only attendance at a meeting held with the intent and
purpose of violating the Act, but also attendance at a meeting.
"being held or conducted in such a way to intentionally prevent
an interested party from attending. ...,.1This passage suggests
that a meeting could be held in technical compliance with all
other provisions of the Act and still be conducted in such a way
as to intentionally exclude an interested party and that, although
action taken at such a meeting may not be void, 92 attendance at
such a meeting knowing it so to be held is criminal.
The need for this provision stems from that Act's lack of (1)
a venue requirement for public meetings, (2) a limitation on the
times at which meetings may be held, and (3) a requirement that
notice of the meeting contain the meeting's purpose or agenda.
Absent such a provision, the Act's failure to impose these requirements could lead to the defeat of the legislative purpose "to
open up the administrative agencies"; :13 agency meetings could
be held at a time or place inconvenient of access to the interested
public,1' 4 or the notice of the meeting could fail to inform the
public of the matters to be acted upon.9 5 Once it is proven that
8 See text accompanying notes 97-101 infra.
89 See text accompanying notes 102-05 infra.
'o

See text accompanying notes 106-10 infra.

91 Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 8, PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 65, § 268 (Supp. 1975), pro-

vides in part: "Any member of any agency who participates in a meeting or hearing
knowing that it is being held or conducted in such a way to intentionally prevent an
interested party from attending or with the intent and purpose of violating this act is
guilty of a summary offense ...."
92 Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Supp. 1975) with id. § 268.
93 PA. H.R. JouR. 2150 (Oct. 3, 1973) (remarks of Representative Rappaport).
" The Public Utilities Commission, for example, has in the past been sharply rebuked for conducting hearings on Philadelphia utility rate increases in Harrisburg. See,
e.g., Hearing for Consumers, KYW-TV/KYW Radio (Philadelphia) Editorial 2365, telecast and broadcast Aug. 19-20, 1974.
95One common pleas court has held, under the Open Meeting Act of 1957, Pub. L.
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the scheduling of the meeting or the exclusion of the meeting's
purpose from the notice was done with intent to "prevent an
interested party from attending,"9 6 the attendants at the meeting
may be subject to prosecution even if formal action taken there
may be valid.
2. Good Faith Protest
Unless good faith protest against the illegality of a meeting
is recognized as a defense to a criminal prosecution under the
Act, the conscientious legislator will be forced to decide, at his
peril and perhaps even at a moment's notice, whether a meeting
is being held with the proscribed illegal intent. If, after fruitless
protest, he withdraws from the meeting, he risks loss of his vote
should a court subsequently find the meeting to have been valid;
if, on the other hand, he decides to remain and so protect his
vote in the event of a subsequent finding of validity, he risks a
finding that the meeting was indeed illegally held, that his protest proves his "knowledge" of the illegality, and that he himself
is guilty of a summary offense under section eight of the Act. It
is, ironically, the conscientious member, who demonstrates his
knowledge through protest, rather than the acquiescent member, who mutely accepts the illegality perpetrated by the majority, that runs the greater risk of demonstrating the knowledge
necessary for a section eight conviction.
The issue of good faith protest as a defense has yet to be
considered by a court. The Florida Attorney General, however,
in construing the criminal provision of his state's statute, has
held that such protest is not a defense. 97 Because the dislike
expressed by Pennsylvania legislators for the Florida statute was
limited to the supposed breadth of the "official acts" covered by
the legislation, with only a cursory reference to the criminal
provision,98 reliance on administrative construction of Florida's
criminal provision might be less misplaced than reliance on judicial construction of other portions of the Florida act. In view,
therefore, of the plain language of section eight, as well as of the
construction placed on the similar Florida provision by that
state's attorney general, a court could read section eight to deny
the good faith defense.
No. 392, [1957] Pa. Laws, that notice of only the meeting itself is required, that "[a]fter
proper notice of time and place, all matters coming before the board may be acted
upon." Ardmore Manor Civic Ass'n v. Haverford Twp., 51 Pa. D. & C.2d 417, 422-23
(C.P. Delaware County 1970).
96 Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 268 (Supp. 1975).
97 FLA. A-rV GEN,. Op. No. 071-32.
98 PA. H.R. JOUR. 1924 (July 25, 1973).
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The rigors of this position, however, can be mitigated by a
strict reading of section eight's scienter requirement. This requirement is two-pronged: the meeting must be held with the
intent of excluding an interested party or violating the Act, and
:
the defendant member must have known of this illegal intent. 9
In accordance with the provision of the Statutory Construction
Act requiring strict construction of penal provisions,1 00 a court
could hold, as a matter of law, that the least uncertainty as to the
meeting's illegality, so long as reasonably and sincerely held, negates the defendant's knowledge of the meeting's illegality. The
court could further find, as a matter of fact, that his continued
presence at a meeting after. his protest evidences the defendant's
doubt as to the illegality; if a defendant were absolutely certain
of the illegality he would have no reason to fear loss of his vote
because any vote taken at the meeting would be invalid. 1 1 Thus,
although an amendment to the Act providing for good faith
protest as a defense to a section eight prosecution would be well
advised, a strict interpretation of the scienter requirement in
favor of a defendant, coupled with sensible exercise of prosecutorial discretion, should prevent any serious injustice.
3. Strict Construction of Penal Statutes
It is commonplace that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed in favor of the accused.' 0 2 In applying this dictate of
the Statutory Construction Act to cases arising under the Sunshine Law, the courts may adopt an unduly restrictive interpretation which will later be carried over by the process of stare decisis into non-criminal suits arising under the Sunshine Law.
This danger is particularly acute in view of the likelihood that
litigants of modest means will choose criminal prosecution, in
which costs are borne by the state and the case prosecuted by the
district attorney, as the means for obtaining judicial interpretations of the Act. 103
Notwithstanding the general rule of construction, there is a
strong argument in favor of construing the Act broadly even in a
criminal prosecution. Many modern regulatory statutes contain
penal provisions as an aid to enforcement but are nevertheless
99 See text accompanying notes 85-87 supra.
100PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1928(b) (Supp. 1974).
101There would still be a danger, however, that a member leaving a meeting would
lose his right to have participated in informal action, disciplinary action, and labor
negotiations conducted at such a meeting since these actions would be valid under §§ 2
and 3 of the Act, PA. STAr. ANN. tit. 65, §§ 262-63 (Supp. 1975).
102 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 1928(b) (Supp. 1974).
103See, e.g., The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), Oct. 25, 1974, at 57, col. 1.
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intended by the legislature to be broadly construed in the public
interest. 10 4 Such a position is especially justifiable when, as in the
case of open meeting acts, the penalties are mild, 10 5 prosecutions
are virtually nonexistent, and conviction carries little if any
moral (though certainly a political) stigma.
Even if a court insists upon using the general rule of strict
construction in a criminal prosecution, it does not necessarily
follow that such an approach will emasculate the Sunshine
Law. A court need not strictly construe all sections of an act in
favor of the criminal defendant; the court could strictly construe
only the scienter requirement while according other sections of
the Act a liberal construction to benefit the public interest. Although a court might find a sufficient actus reus to justify conviction, it could acquit on the ground that the particular defendant had interpreted the Act so narrowly that he lacked the
necessary knowledge of the illegality. The scienter requirement
thus provides the Pennsylvania courts with a means of narrowly
construing the Act in a criminal prosecution without establishing
a dangerous precedent encouraging future secrecy.
4. The Initiation of Prosecution
Responsibility for prosecuting violators of the Act rests, as in
all criminal prosecutions, primarily with the district attorney of
each county;10 6 private individuals are limited to filing complaints with the district attorney for action by his office. 10 7 This
scheme gives rise to the danger that a politically motivated prosecutor will employ the criminal provision of the Act to harass his
political opponents.1 0 8 Assuming that the prosecutor's political
motivation can be established, of course, the accused would be
entitled to a dismissal of charges on first amendment and equal
protection grounds. 10 9 Proving such discriminatory intent, however, is usually difficult," 0 so that the presence of criminal sancCf. Laman v. McCord, 432 S.W.2d 753, 755 (Ark. 1968).
The Pennsylvania legislature limited the penalty to a $100 fine plus costs, Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 8, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 268 (Supp. 1975), after considering
that it did "not really want to send public officials to jail for violating the open-meeting
provision," PA. H.R. JoUR. 1836 (July 24, 1973) (remarks of Representative Miller).
"06See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1402 (Supp. 1975).
107 But see id. § 1409 (1956). Similar procedures are followed in all other states with
criminally enforceable open meeting acts with the exception of Washington, which au104
105

thorizes private prosecutions under the rubric of "civil penalty." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §

42.30.120 (Supp. 1975).
108 PA. H.R. JouR. 1837 (July 24, 1973) (remarks of Representative Dorr).
19 Cf. United States v. Crowthers, 456 F.2d 1074 (4th Cir. 1972).
"1 United States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 174 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Malinowski, 472 F.2d 850, 860 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 970 (1973).
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tions in the Act does create a danger, limited primarily by not
much more than the force of public opinion, that discriminatory
prosecutions might indeed be launched by a politically motivated
district attorney.
5.

Evaluation of the Criminal Provision

The section eight criminal provision is probably not worth
the problems inherent in it: the risk of convicting well-meaning
agency members who remain at a meeting only to protect their
vote after protesting an apparent illegality; 1 1 ' the danger that
courts will use the presence of penal provisions as an excuse for
narrowly construing the Act; 1 2 and the possibility of 3 discriminatory and harassing prosecutions of public officials."
Although it is arguable that the criminal provision will encourage compliance with the Sunshine Law, the ambivalence of
the public toward open meeting prosecutions 1 4 and the rarity of
prosecutions under other open meeting acts with criminal provisions belie this contention. The benefit derived from the section
-the possibility that deliberate attempts to discourage public attendance by scheduling meetings at times and places inconvenient of access will be prosecuted" 15 -could easily be obtained,
on a less haphazard basis, by a properly worded amendment.
B. The Invalidation Remedy
Section two of the Sunshine Law provides that "[n]o formal
action shall be valid unless such formal action is taken during a
public meeting."' " 6 Read in conjunction with section nine, which
authorizes commonwealth court and the courts of common pleas
to render declaratory judgments under the Act," ' 7 section two
provides an additional means by which the Act may be
enforced-through obtaining a declaration of invalidity, forcing
the agency to hold a new meeting under procedures complying
with the Act. Such an invalidation provision, however, can, if
misused, disrupt the orderly administration of government business by casting the validity of official actions into doubt and work
severe injustice on individuals relying in good faith on the validity of the official action called into question.
"' See text accompanying notes 97-101 supra.
112See text accompanying notes 102-05 supra.
3See text accompanying notes 106-10 supra.
124 Cf. PA. H.R. JOUR. 1836 (July 24, 1973) (remarks of Representative Miller).
',See text accompanying notes 91-96 supra.
116 Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Supp. 1975).
11"Id. § 9, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (Supp. 1975).
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Four problems arise in connection with the invalidation provision. Is good faith a defense to an invalidation action? What
protection do innocent members of the public have after relying
in good faith on official actions subsequently declared invalid?
Must a declaration of invalidity be obtained before one proceeds
to violate a statute or ordinance apparently valid on its face, or
may one challenge the law in defense to a prosecution for its
violation? And finally, how may invalid actions be subsequently
ratified by the offending agency?
1. Good Faith as a Defense
Although the language of the Sunshine Law does not appear to admit of a "good faith" defense to an invalidation action,
the potential for disruption of public business inherent in the
invalidation remedy" t8 requires such a defense. A requirement
that bad faith be shown to justify invalidation under the Sunshine Law would not unduly prejudice the public; citizens suffering a personal or financial injury would have standing to object
on due process grounds so long as they could show the causal
link between the injury suffered and the failure to receive
notice.11 9 Invalidation would still be useful in "impress[ing] on
the members of the agency the importance and vitality of the
open meeting requirements,"'' 20 but such "impressing" should be
unnecessary in the case of a good faith error unlikely to recur.
That invalidation is basically an equitable remedy 12 should allow
the courts to exercise their broad equitable powers in invoking
the good faith defense.
2. Invalidation Injury to Third Parties
Four classes of citizens are likely to be prejudiced by invalidation of agency actions: criminal defendants, government contractors, utility companies seeking rate increases, and property
owners seeking zoning changes. Only the last of these classes,
however, will be subject to serious prejudice as a result of invalidation rulings.
118 Governor Brown vetoed an early version of the California open meeting act (the
Ralph M. Brown Act), CAL. GOV'T CODE § 54950-60 (West 1966), out of precisely such a
concern. Comment, supra note 53, at 1664.
1"9 See Chester County Bank v. East Whiteland Twp., 27 Pa. D. & C.2d 384, 394-95
(Chester County Ct. Quarter Sess. 1962), and authorities cited therein.
120Comment, supra note 53, at 1665.
121 Invalidation would be enforced through a declaratory judgment, traditionally an
equitable remedy. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 836 (Supp. 1975), vests the same broad
discretion in a court to issue a declaratory judgment as exists in equity.
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Criminal defendants who relied in good faith on the apparent repeal of a criminal sanction should have little difficulty in
asserting that reliance; traditional due process notice requirements should protect such defendants from the effects of an
ambiguous agency action, and one would also expect an appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion in such cases.
Government contractors should have little to fear because
few citizens will have an incentive to attack the awarding of government contracts even if liberal standing requirements are established for such an attack. And if rival contractors attack the
award of a contract 122 for having been made in a secret meeting,
it should be necessary only to repeat the formal award, not the
preparatory bidding, 1 23 so that the result will remain the same at
least where bidding has occurred.
Utility companies, similarly, are unlikely to suffer serious
prejudice as a result of the invalidation of agency action granting
a rate increase. The utility companies should have no difficulty
in justifying a rate increase in a subsequent public hearing if
such an increase is indeed warranted.
The chance of serious prejudice resulting from invalidation
is greatest for property owners seeking zoning changes. Although there may be little objection to limiting a landowner's use
of his property by declaring a zoning modification invalid when
he has not materially altered his position in reliance thereon,
there would appear to be grave inequity in cases of good faith,
justifiable, detrimental reliance. Because it is doubtful that the
doctrine of equitable estoppel could be used to protect the property owner in such a situation, 24 this prejudice must be viewed
as a serious problem with the invalidation remedy.
3.

Choice of Forum for Asserting Invalidity

Section nine of the Sunshine Law provides that commonwealth court shall have jurisdiction over all suits against state
agencies and that the courts of common pleas shall have jurisdiction over suits against other agencies.' 25 The section broadly
authorizes the courts to enforce the Act by declaratory judg1 26
ment, injunction, or any "other remedy deemed appropriate.'
122 See generally PA. H.R. JOUR. 1836-37 (Jufy 24, 1973)(remarks of-Representative
Rappaport).
123 See generally text accompanying notes 30-37 supra.
124 Estoppel ordinarily cannot be invoked against a municipality or government
agency acting in its governmental, as opposed to its proprietary, capacity. See Commonwealth v. Western Md. R.R., 377 Pa. 312, 105 A.2d 336 (1954).
125Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 9, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (Supp. 1975).
26
1 Id.
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An unresolved question is whether the validity of an action may
be attacked indirectly, as an element of an action or defense over
which common pleas court has jurisdiction, or whether the validity must be attacked directly in a suit against the offending
agency. If indirect attacks are allowed, then the attacker will be
able, at least in certain instances, to avoid the jurisdiction of
commonwealth court and argue his case as part of an action in a
court of common pleas. This forum shopping could frustrate the
purpose both of section nine of the Sunshine Law and the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970,127 by allowing evasion of
commonwealth court's jurisdiction over state agencies.
Suppose, for example, that a citizen objected to the procedures used in holding a Public Utilities Commission rate hearing.
If he were to bring an action against the Commission, he would
be forced to file suit in commonwealth court.' 28 If an indirect
attack is allowed, however, he could simply refuse to pay the
additional rate, and, when threatened with a termination of utility services, file suit against the utility company in the appropriate court of common pleas. The Commission, then, if it wished
to defend its action, would be forced to intervene in the common
pleas suit, section nine and the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act
to the contrary.
In such a case, where a litigant is obviously engaged in
forum shopping, a court of common pleas should refuse jurisdiction over the suit, citing the policy of section nine and the
Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act. 129 Suppose, on the other hand,
that a citizen violates a criminal ordinance or a regulatory provision enforceable through civil penalties. Should he be permitted
in such an action to raise the invalidity of the ordinance as a
defense? The legislative history of the Sunshine Law provides no
answer to this question. A comparison of section two of the Sunshine Law, however, with the invalidation provision of New
that such an indirect attack on
Jersey's open meeting act suggests
130
allowed.
be
might
the ordinance
The relevant section of the New Jersey act reads: "Official
action taken in violation of the requirements of this act shall be
voidable in a proceeding in the Superior Court."'13 1 This language
implies that action taken in violation of the Act is not invalid or
127
128

PA. STAT. ANN tit. 17, § 211.508 (Supp. 1975).
See note 127 supra & accompanying text.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 211.508 (Supp. 1975).
13"Compare Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Supp.
121

1975), with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-5 (Supp. 1975).
131N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:4-5 (Supp. 1975) (emphasis supplied).
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void from its moment of passage, but only once invalidated by
the Superior Court as a result of an invalidation suit. The Sunshine Law, on the other hand, provides that "No formal action
shall be valid unless such formal action is taken during a public
meeting,"1 32 implying invalidity from the very moment that the
action is taken. Under this reading, the invalidity of an action can
be raised in other litigation, at least so long as the litigant's purpose is not to frustrate the Act's grant of jurisdiction to commonwealth court. 133 Because such a broad scope for the invalidation provision could result in the occurrence of the public ill
which the ordinance or regulatory provision was designed to
prevent without the agency's having been put on notice as to the
invalidity of its action so that corrective measures could be taken,
the provision should be more narrowly construed: only commonwealth court should have the power to invalidate agency
action.
4. Ratification of Invalid Actions
That an agency has taken formal action at a secret meeting
and that such action is hence invalid does not preclude the
agency from ever again adopting the action; nor, once the
agency realizes its error, is there any reason for it to await a
declaration of invalidity before it can take steps to ensure the
validity of its action. Some theory of ratification, therefore, must
be developed to permit the validation of previously invalid actions prior to a judicial determination of invalidity. Such ratification, however, must not be so perfunctory as to constitute the
"by-the-numbers" vote condemned by the Sunshine Law's prin13 4
cipal sponsor.
The measures necessary to ratify an invalid action will depend upon the purpose that public meetings are seen as serving.
If the purpose of public meetings is to inform the public of the
workings of the government and the reasons for taking the action in question, then it will be sufficient that the agency reconsider the action in public and fully state its reasons for taking it.
Dissenting members must, of course, be permitted to state their
opposition and the reasons therefor, and a new vote should be
required. Under this theory, however, the agency need not reconsider its position seriously.
132
33

1

Pennsylvania Sunshine Law § 2, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 262 (Supp. 1975).
Id. § 9, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 269 (Supp. 1975); see text accompanying note 129

supra.
134 PA.

H.R.

JouR.

2151 (Oct. 3, 1973) (remarks of Representative Knepper).
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If, on the other hand, the purpose of the open meeting
requirement is seen to be the obtaining of public input into the
decisionmaking process, then a mere statement of the reasons
for the agency's actions and a formal vote, both in public, will
not suffice, and the agency members will be forced to reconsider
their decision seriously in the light of the public views that the
meeting elicits. In such a case, the courts would, in passing on
the sufficiency of the ratification process, be required to determine whether or not agency members reconsidered their positions in good faith before voting. The legislative history refutes
the latter view, so that no such subjective determinations are
necessary on the part of a reviewing court.
The legislature clearly rejected the notion that the Sunshine
Law was a "town meeting" rather than merely an "open meeting" act. Representative Knepper, the statute's principal sponsor,
explained,
It was never the intention of this bill to require any
public agency to conduct a town meeting ....

It is sim-

ply to guarantee the right of the citizens who elected
those officials to know what those officials are doing, to
make sure that they are not voting behind the scenes
and simply
coming out and rehearsing before the
35
1

public.

All that should be necessary for proper ratification of previously
invalid action, then, is a public consideration of the action in
sufficient detail to apprise the public of the nature of the action
and the reasons therefor.
Whether a particular course of action is sufficient to ratify a
previously invalid action is largely a matter of fact to be left to
the decision of the trial court. The standard for determining
sufficiency of ratification has usually focused on whether the
1 36
or a "sham."' 1 37
subsequent public vote is merely "perfunctory"'

Although such definitions leave a wide discretion in the factfinder, the court should not determine whether the proceedings
are a sham simply on the basis of whether the public was actually
informed of the reasons for the agency's action; the sufficiency
of ratification should be judged solely by whether the methods
employed were reasonably calculated to inform the public.
135Id. 3282 (Jan. 30, 1974) (remarks of Representative Knepper). See also School

District v. Concerned Citizens, 117 Pittsburgh LegalJ. 285 (C.P. Allegheny County 1969).
136 See, e.g., Kramer v. Board of Adjustment, 80 N.J. Super. 454, 462-64, 194 A.2d
26, 30-31
(L. Div. 1963).
37
'

See 49 TEXAs L. REV. 764 (1971).
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5. Evaluation of the Invalidation Provision
As in the case of criminal penalties, the price of the invalidation remedy may exceed its actual value. As one court noted,
"[T]here are enough prospective difficulties in the implementation of [the open meeting law] . . . without putting otherwise

valid action at the risk of subsequent determination that the
particular deliberations were required to be held under public
scrutiny."1 3 8 The disruptive effect that invalidation might have
on the conduct of public business have been noted by several
commentators 3 9 and indeed prompted the Governor of
California to oppose such a provision in that state's open meeting act. 140 The presence of an invalidation provision could serve
to limit the scope of the Act's open meeting provisions themselves as the courts strain to find agency actions valid, and then
apply the same definitions in suits for injunctive relief. Finally,
the remedy could serve as a source of inequitable injury to innocent third parties justifiably relying on the agency action.1 4 ' The
Act would by no means be emasculated if relief were limited to
injunction and mandamus, as long as injunctions were framed
1 42
broadly enough to discourage evasion.
III.

CONCLUSION

The Pennsylvania Sunshine Law balances several conflicting
interests. Although the very broad definition of agencies covered
suggests that the paramount interest is the public's right to be
informed, the various limitations on the Act's coverage illustrate
countervailing policy considerations in the contexts of labor
negotations, disciplinary proceedings, emergencies, and the
political process.
One commentator has asked whether his state's open meeting act may not be "a right without a remedy.' 1 43 Pennsylvania's
Sunshine Law may be, on the contrary, a right with too many
remedies. The criminal provisions, which will rarely if ever be
enforced, may result in narrow construction of the entire Act
and pose a threat in the hands of a politically motivated prosecutor. The invalidation provisions also endanger the stability
138Elmer v. Board of Zoning Adjustment, 176 N.E.2d 16, 18 (Mass. 1961).
See Note, supra note 3, at 1214; 49 TEXAS L. REV. 764, 776 (1971).

140 See Comment, supra note 52, at 1664.
141See text accompanying notes 120-22 supra.
142 But see Comment, The Iowa Open Meetings Act: A Right Without a Remedy? 58 IowA
L. REV. 210 (1972).
43
1 Id.
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and predictability of public policy. This Comment has argued
that the policy of the Sunshine Law can be adequately enforced
merely through the invocation of injunction and mandamus relief, at least so long as the courts do not take an unduly restrictive approach to such relief. 144 The principal enforcement
mechanism, after all, must be the force of public opinion
aroused by a "watchdog" press, 145 and such public opinion, reinforced through judicial decree, can find expression as easily
through injunction and mandamus as through any more drastic
remedies. It is thus proposed that both the invalidation and
criminal provisions of the Act be repealed. Alternatively, the use
of the invalidation remedy should at least be limited to cases in
which the agency members have acted in bad faith, and private
parties injured as a result of their good faith reliance on the
validity of an agency action should be allowed to recover damages against the agency or political subdivision concerned.
144

But see id.

Statement of Governor Milton J. Shapp, quoted in The Philadelphia Inquirer,
July 20, 1974, at 1, col. 2.
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